Pavel Havlícek, Czech political analyst and expert on Central European affairs, met with RFE/RL's Georgian service to explain the results of the country's recent parliamentary election – a vote that gave former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš a resounding victory and left the ruling coalition reeling. He discusses what these changes mean not only for Czech domestic policy, but also for the country's foreign policy, its stance on Ukraine and its relations with partners such as Georgia.
Let's start with the basics: What just happened in this election? Who was ahead – and who wasn't?
The headline is the strong performance of Andrej Babiš, the former prime minister. He secured around 35% of the vote, more than any result he had achieved in the past. This is not only numerically important, but also symbolically important. He managed to consolidate a broad swath of the anti-establishment electorate, gaining support from both far-left and far-right voters. This shift likely explains why traditional pro-Russian and fringe parties fared so poorly: the far left failed to even cross the 5 percent threshold required to enter parliament, and far-right groups ended up with under 8 percent, despite poll forecasts of 14-15 percent. The ruling Spolu coalition was the biggest loser, losing around 20 seats – a major blow to its influence and reputation.
What ensured Babiš's triumphant victory? And what is behind the failure of the ruling party?
This is where things get more complex. In absolute terms, the coalition actually did relatively well, securing over 23% of the vote. A drop from 27 to 23 is not a crushing defeat, especially considering that they only beat Babiš by one seat last time. What drove Babiš to unprecedented heights was his ability to attract disengaged voters, many from disadvantaged regions, who supported him in the hope of improving their living conditions.
As a billionaire businessman, it is assumed that Babiš knows how to sell his product. What was his selling point to the Czech voter and why was it so appealing?
Essentially, it was a promise of comprehensive socioeconomic redistribution. His campaign focused largely on domestic issues and painted a contrasting picture to what the current government offered – namely an emphasis on foreign policy, security and defense: “We are the ones who defend the Czech Republic against Russia; we managed to wean the Czech Republic off Russian gas.” While Babiš basically said: “Look, I'm not the radical they think I am. We don't want to take radical steps. We want to stay in the EU and NATO – but we will criticize the EU for interfering in our internal affairs.”
Will it be difficult for him to form a coalition with the SPD and the drivers?
We are already seeing things moving surprisingly quickly. Drivers are demanding some important departments in the new government, including the Foreign Ministry, while the SPD is demanding the Interior Ministry. We will see how much Babiš is willing to accommodate them – for example, it is almost certain that he will not give up the Defense Ministry.
What will Babiš's new Czech Republic look like – in terms of domestic and foreign policy?
I wrote an article entitled “The World According to Andrej Babiš” in which I emphasized his focus on domestic political dynamics. Domestically, he wants to return to some of his old projects – such as electronic proof of payment, a measure he introduced to combat the shadow economy. He says, “Look, we’re going to mobilize resources.” He wants to give high priority to the private sector, which he sees as the main driver of growth and really stimulating the economy.
On the outside, everything is very simple and predominantly negative: no to the EU migration agreement, no to the Green Deal, no to joining the euro and no to digital regulation. Babiš will easily follow the Patriots for Europe narrative: “We are a sovereign nation; we decide what is best for us.”
Getting into bed with people like Ivanishvili would definitely harm Babiš's interests within the EU. He will not be willing to take the baton for him
When it comes to cooperation between NATO and the Visegrád Four countries, he is a big supporter. He says that these are the transatlantic bonds that hold us together, that they are important to our place in the world. He wants a good relationship with the White House, good relations with his neighbors, but above all, of course, with Orbán.
So is it to be expected that the Orbán and Fico union will turn into a triumvirate?
There will certainly be some normalization of relations, especially with Slovakia. Czech-Slovak relations are currently very bad due to the opposing agenda, especially regarding Russia and Ukraine. So there will certainly be some efforts to normalize things. Babiš's first visit abroad will be to Slovakia, where he will try to repair bridges. But as far as entering into a full-fledged partnership with Fico and Orbán is concerned, that is unlikely.
He is and remains a pragmatic figure. It is in his interest to maintain good relations with Germany and France, where he does much of his business. He also wants to keep open contact with Poland, another important country, not only in terms of national security but also for his private business interests. Babiš wants to be a recognized and respected leader whose word carries weight; He has no intention of being Europe's black sheep like Orbán. If he were to travel to Moscow and begin negotiations with Putin about a return to Russian gas, he would be burned at the stake at home in the Czech Republic. You can only stretch the rope so far, and it's already pretty thin. That is why it is impossible for him to fully join Fico and Orbán in the fight against the rest of Europe. It will be far more flexible than both.
What role will President Pavel play? Will he try to defend himself against Babiš on foreign and defense issues?
In any case, he will act as a guarantor of the constitutional order and traditional alliances of the Czech Republic. NATO and the EU are very important to him. In the run-up to the election, he said bluntly that if there was a candidate for State or Defense who challenged membership in one of these alliances, he would directly veto the nomination.
In addition, there are a number of other measures with which the president can make life quite difficult for the government and will not shy away from a fight if necessary. But at this point, especially early on, he's going to be pretty tactical. He will pick his battles and focus on the big issues.
Would one of these major problems be the Czech initiative to supply arms to Ukraine? What does Babiš's return mean for Ukraine in general?
It is difficult to make blanket statements, but support for Ukraine will not be as clear as it was under the previous administration. The key question is how this will affect things on the ground. They will probably review a lot of things, but I don't think they will give up the initiative entirely.
Babiš wants to be a recognized and respected leader whose word carries weight; He has no intention of being Europe's black sheep like Orbán
There is both domestic and international pressure – domestically from the future opposition and internationally from partners. I already suspect that there will probably be an attempt to bring the ammunition initiative into a new format, perhaps rename it, but not to abolish it completely. That would be an enormous reputational risk and would make no economic sense. The initiative works by having other countries come to you with money, ask you to work on things, and let your companies make money, which in turn puts money into the treasury. So Babiš would really be shooting himself in the foot if he abolished it.
What do you think is the mood in Moscow? Are they celebrating?
Maybe they aren't celebrating because their biggest allies in the Czech political scene didn't even make it into parliament, but maybe they have reason enough to smile. The very harsh anti-Russian rhetoric is definitely disappearing, and that certainly makes the Kremlin happier than it was with the outgoing government.
A question about the Georgian Dream party, whose leaders rushed to congratulate Babiš. Will they get another ally in Brussels alongside Orbán and Fico? And are the recently imposed sanctions likely to be lifted?
At this point it seems unlikely that there will be a major change in relations between Prague and Tbilisi. Of course, the current Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský has been criticized for his tweets etc. for being overly activist, and this tone will most likely disappear. But I do not believe that the names of Georgian government officials or representatives of the repressive apparatus will be removed from the sanctions list.
But there won't be any more names added?
That's correct. Maybe it will slow down, but I would say that it is still too early for Georgian Dream to celebrate and cheer for Babiš.
Do you see that Babiš in Brussels is publicly supporting Georgia, similar to Orbán, saying: “These are good people”?
Absolutely not. And the problem with Babiš is that it's really not in his interest. There is nothing about this issue that would capture his attention so much that he would feel the need to raise his voice and advocate for the cause.
As a billionaire, could Ivanishvili perhaps present a convincing argument to convince Babiš?
There is no mutual interest. And Babiš is very careful – he has a pretty good compass for these things and knows where something could actually harm him. Getting into bed with people like Ivanishvili would definitely harm his interests within the EU, and he will not be willing to take the baton for him. As I said, he has no intention of becoming Europe's new black sheep.
Interview by Rays TVbrize